The performance and robustness of interest-rate rules in models of the euro area by Adalid, Ramón et al.
WORKING PAPER SERIES
 










ECB CONFERENCE ON 
MONETARY POLICY AND 
IMPERFECT KNOWLEDGEIn 2005 all ECB 
publications 
will feature 




NO. 479 / APRIL 2005
This paper can be downloaded without charge from 
http://www.ecb.int or from the Social Science Research Network 
electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=701293.
ECB CONFERENCE ON 
















1   The paper summarises the results of a project aimed at evaluating the performance of monetary policy rules in a number of small to
medium-scale models developed by Euroystem staff which have been regularly used for policy analysis.Helpful comments by Keith
Küster,Sergio Nicoletti Altimari,Athanasios Orphanides,Glenn Rudebusch,Frank Smets,Volker Wieland,John Williams,RafWouters,
by participants at the ECB conference on ‘Monetary Policy and Imperfect Knowledge’and by an anonymous referee are greatly
appreciated.The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect views of the European Central Bank or
the Banca d’Italia.Any remaining errors are of course the sole responsibility of the authors.
2   Directorate General Statistics,European Central Bank,e-mail:ramon.adalid_lozano@ecb.int
3   Directorate General Research,European Central Bank;e-mail:gunter.coenen@ecb.int,homepage:http://www.guentercoenen.com
4   Directorate General Research,European Central Bank;e-mail:peter.mcadam@ecb.int
5   Economic Research Department,Banca d’Italia;e-mail:stefano.siviero@bancaditalia.it© European Central Bank, 2005
Address
Kaiserstrasse 29
60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Postal address
Postfach 16 03 19
60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Telephone




+49 69 1344 6000
Telex
411 144 ecb d
All rights reserved.
Reproduction for educational and non-
commercial purposes is permitted provided
that the source is acknowledged.
The views expressed in this paper do not
necessarily reflect those of the European
Central Bank.
The statement of purpose for the ECB
Working Paper Series is available from
the ECB website, http://www.ecb.int.
ISSN 1561-0810 (print)
ISSN 1725-2806 (online)
ECB Conference on “Monetary policy and imperfect knowledge” 
 
This paper was presented at an ECB Conference on “Monetary policy and imperfect 
knowledge”, held on 14-15 October 2004 in Würzburg, Germany. The conference 
organisers were Vitor Gaspar, Charles Goodhart, Anil Kashyap and Frank Smets. The 
conference programme, including papers and discussions, can be found on the ECB’s 
 
 
web site (http://www.ecb.int/events/conferences/past/html/index.en.html).  3
ECB






2 The models of the euro area 9
2.1 An outline of the euro area models 10
2.2 Differences in monetary policy
transmission 14
3 Evaluating the performance of
interest-rate rules 16
3.1 The methodology 16
3.2
benchmark rules 18




4.2 A fault-tolerance analysis of
optimised rules 25
5 Designing robust interest-rate rules 27




European Central Bank working paper series 44
The performance of optimised
The performance of optimised rulesAbstract
In this paper, we examine the performance and robustness of optimised interest-rate
rules in four models of the euro area which diﬀer considerably in terms of size, degree
of aggregation, relevance of forward-looking behavioural elements and adherence to
micro-foundations. Our ﬁndings are broadly consistent with results documented for
models of the U.S. economy: backward-looking models require relatively more aggres-
sive policies with at most moderate inertia; rules that are optimised for such models
tend to perform reasonably well in forward-looking models, while the reverse is not
necessarily true; and, hence, the operating characteristics of robust rules (i.e., rules
that perform satisfactorily in all models) are heavily weighted towards those required
by backward-looking models.
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April 2005Non-Technical Summary
The design of robust monetary policy rules has attracted considerable interest in recent
macroeconomic research. This interest largely reﬂects the increased awareness on the part
of policy-makers and academics alike that, when evaluating the possible consequences of
alternative monetary policies, the existing uncertainties about the structure of the economy
need to be given due account. As a result, a large body of research has been oriented
towards identifying the characteristics of monetary policy rules that perform ‘reasonably
well’ across a range of potentially non-nested and competing macroeconomic models. While
this line of research has primarily focused on models of the U.S. economy, no systematic
study has yet been conducted for the euro area.
In an attempt to ﬁll this gap, we concentrate on the euro area and examine the perfor-
mance and robustness of monetary policy rules using a rather diverse set of macroeconomic
models of the euro area economy. Such an examination seems particularly relevant as the
single monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) has to focus on the euro area
as a whole, being a new and still relatively unexplored economic entity, and with models of
the euro area having been developed only very recently. Speciﬁcally, our analysis relies on
four models of the euro area economy which have been built by staﬀ of the Eurosystem in
recent years. These models diﬀer considerably in terms of size, degree of aggregation, rel-
evance of forward-looking behavioural elements and adherence to micro-foundations. They
thus cover a wide range of features that are ap r i o r iconsidered to be of high relevance in
the context of evaluating the robustness of monetary policy rules. One of our main goals is
to ascertain which of the various features with respect to which these models diﬀer are of
importance when designing rules suitable for model-based evaluations of monetary policy,
and which features are, by contrast, arguably less important.
In terms of methodology, our analysis builds on recent work by Levin, Wieland and
Williams (1999, 2003) and Levin and Williams (2003). This methodology involves imple-
menting simple reaction functions describing the response of the short-term nominal interest
rate to inﬂation and the output gap, either observed or forecast, and then optimising over
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April 2005the respective response coeﬃcients. The performance of these optimised interest-rate rules
is then evaluated across alternative, potentially competing models with regard to their abil-
ity to stabilise inﬂation and output around their targets, while avoiding undue ﬂuctuations
in the nominal interest rate itself.
The ﬁndings of our analysis are broadly consistent with the results documented for mod-
els of the U.S. economy: backward-looking models require relatively more aggressive policies
with at most moderate inertia; rules that are optimised for such models tend to perform
reasonably well in forward-looking models, while the reverse is not necessarily true; and,
hence, the operating characteristics of robust rules (i.e., rules that perform satisfactorily
in all models) are heavily weighted towards those required by backward-looking models.
While other model features such as variable and country coverage and adherence to micro-
foundations are apparently of relevance as well, the nature of the expectation formation
mechanism embedded in the various models seems to be of key importance for explain-
ing our results. This in turn suggests that future research that aims at casting additional
light on the empirical relevance of forward-looking behavioural elements in macroeconomic
models may enhance the reliability and usefulness of interest-rate rules for model-based
evaluations of monetary policy.
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The design of robust monetary policy rules has attracted considerable interest in recent
macroeconomic research. This interest largely reﬂects the increased awareness on the part
of policy-makers and academics alike that, when evaluating the possible consequences of
alternative monetary policies, the existing uncertainties about the structure of the economy
need to be given due account. As a result, a large body of research has been oriented towards
identifying the characteristics of monetary policy rules that perform ‘reasonably well’ across
a range of potentially non-nested and competing macroeconomic models.1 While this line
of research has primarily focused on models of the U.S. economy, no systematic study has
yet been conducted for the euro area.2
In an attempt to ﬁll this gap, we concentrate on the euro area and examine the perfor-
mance and robustness of monetary policy rules using a rather diverse set of macroeconomic
models of the euro area economy. Such an examination seems particularly relevant as the
single monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) has to focus on the euro area
as a whole, being a new and still relatively unexplored economic entity, and with models of
the euro area having been developed only very recently. Speciﬁcally, our analysis relies on
four models of the euro area economy which have been built by staﬀ of the Eurosystem in
recent years. These models diﬀer considerably in terms of size, degree of aggregation, rel-
evance of forward-looking behavioural elements and adherence to micro-foundations. They
thus cover a wide range of features that are ap r i o r iconsidered to be of high relevance in
the context of evaluating the robustness of monetary policy rules.3 One of our main goals
is to ascertain which of the various features with respect to which these models diﬀer are of
importance when designing rules suitable for model-based evaluations of monetary policy,
and which features are, by contrast, arguably less important.
1For an early claim in this respect see McCallum (1988).
2Earlier studies of the performance of interest-rate rules across alternative models of the U.S. economy are
provided in Bryant, Hooper and Mann (1993) and Taylor (1999). More recent studies have been undertaken
by Levin, Wieland and Williams (2003) and Levin and Williams (2003). The study of Cˆ ot´ e et al. (2002)
focuses on models of the Canadian economy.
3Indeed, Svensson (2003) argues that models used to analyse simple monetary policy rules, such as the
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Williams (1999, 2003) and Levin and Williams (2003) – henceforth referred to as LWW
(1999, 2003) and LW (2003), respectively.4 This methodology involves implementing sim-
ple reaction functions describing the response of the short-term nominal interest rate to
inﬂation and the output gap, either observed or forecast, and then optimising over the
respective response coeﬃcients. The performance of these optimised interest-rate rules is
then evaluated across alternative, potentially competing models with regard to their ability
to stabilise inﬂation and output around their targets, while avoiding undue ﬂuctuations in
the nominal interest rate itself.
Of course, variables other than inﬂation and the output gap may enter the interest-rate
rule, such as the exchange rate or monetary and ﬁnancial-market indicators. However, the
literature tends to suggest that including information variables of this kind in the policy rule
yields relatively modest gains in model-based evaluations because they are typically highly
correlated with the interest rate itself or closely related with the measures of inﬂation and
the output gap entering the rule (although this result may not hold in suﬃciently complex
models). Furthermore, simple rules with a feedback to a small set of variables are arguably
more robust to model mis-speciﬁcation and uncertainty than rules based on a larger set of
variables, which might over-ﬁt speciﬁc model characteristics.
From an institutional viewpoint, the advantage of simple interest-rate rules is clearly
their transparency and, thus, the ease with which they may be communicated to and moni-
tored by the outside world. While it is unlikely that monetary policy-makers will follow their
literal execution, such rules may nonetheless be a useful benchmark for assessing the actual
conduct of monetary policy. Likewise, from an empirical point of view, simple interest-rate
rules seem to match the data well for the United States as well as a number of European
countries (see Clarida et al., 1998). More recently, evidence for the euro area as a whole
has been provided by Gerdesmeier and Roﬃa (2004).
4There are alternative approaches to analysing the consequences of uncertainty about the structure of
the economy (see for example Giannoni, 2002, Giannoni and Woodford, 2002, Hansen and Sargent, 2002,
Onatski and Stock, 2002, Onatski and Williams, 2003, and Tetlow and von zur Muehlen, 2001). This co-
existence of alternative approaches reﬂects the fact that there has not yet emerged a consensus on how to
address the issue of model uncertainty.
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els of the U.S. economy: backward-looking models require relatively more aggressive policies
with at most moderate inertia; rules that are optimised for such models tend to perform
reasonably well in forward-looking models, while the reverse is not necessarily true; and,
hence, the operating characteristics of robust rules (i.e., rules that perform satisfactorily in
all models) are heavily weighted towards those required by backward-looking models. In
the course of collecting these results, we highlight a number of model features, notably the
degree of forward-lookingness, which play a crucial role in shaping the operating character-
istics of optimised interest-rate rules. This in turn suggests that future empirical research
that aims at casting additional light on these features may enhance the reliability and
usefulness of interest-rate rules for model-based evaluations of monetary policy.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the set of euro
area models used in our analysis and illustrates the implied diﬀerences in inﬂation and
output-gap dynamics in response to a monetary policy shock. Section 3 brieﬂy describes
the methodology used for evaluating the performance of interest-rate rules and provides
a set of optimised benchmark rules for each of the euro area models under examination.
Section 4 evaluates the robustness of these benchmark rules when there is uncertainty about
the true structure of the euro area economy, as represented by the co-existence of possibly
competing models, while Section 5 identiﬁes the operating characteristics of rules that attain
satisfactory outcomes across the set of models used. Section 6 reports additional sensitivity
analysis and Section 7 concludes.
2 The Models of the Euro Area
To examine the performance of monetary policy rules across a range of potentially competing
models of the euro area economy, we utilise a set of four macroeconomic models which
diﬀer considerably in terms of variable and country coverage, relevance of forward-looking
behavioural elements and adherence to micro-foundations. All models are estimated with
aggregate euro area-wide data, except one which separately models the three largest euro
9
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while forward-looking elements abound in the other two. All models are consistent with
basic economic principles, however there is only one in our set of models that is strictly
based on the assumption of optimising agents. Hence, the models under examination cover
a fairly broad range of diﬀerent modelling strategies.
In the remainder of this section, we brieﬂy present the four models of the euro area
and illustrate the implied diﬀerences in inﬂation and output-gap dynamics in response to a
monetary policy shock.
2.1 An Outline of the Euro Area Models
The Coenen-Wieland Model
The Coenen-Wieland (CW) model (see Coenen and Wieland, 2000) is a small-scale model
of aggregate supply and aggregate demand which is designed to capture the broad char-
acteristics of inﬂation and output dynamics in the euro area. Since its development, the
model has been mainly used as a laboratory for evaluating the performance of alternative
monetary policy strategies.
The supply side of the model incorporates price and wage staggering, with wage setters
negotiating long-term nominal wage contracts with reference to past contracts that are still
in eﬀect and future contracts that will be negotiated over the life of the current contract. If
wage setters expect the output gap to be positive, they adjust the current contract wages
upward. Consequently, inﬂation depends on own leads and lags, excess-demand conditions
as well as transitory contract wage shocks, the latter representing ‘cost-push’ shocks. There
are two versions of the supply side which feature distinct types of staggered wage contracts:
the nominal wage contracting speciﬁcation due to Taylor (1980) and the relative real wage
contracting speciﬁcation by Fuhrer and Moore (1995).5 The two speciﬁcations diﬀer with
respect to the degree of inﬂation persistence that they induce, with Fuhrer-Moore-type
5While the two types of speciﬁcation represent rules for price and wage setting that are not explicitly
derived from a framework with optimising agents, they need not be necessarily inconsistent with such a
framework. More recently, Taylor-type contracts have been analysed within more fully ﬂeshed-out dynamic
general equilibrium models (see for example Chari et al., 2000, or King and Wolman, 1999). Fuhrer-Moore-
type contracts, however, have typically been criticised for lacking micro-foundations.
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Taylor-type contracts is used.6
A simple aggregate demand relationship relates the output gap, measured as the devi-
ation of actual output from a smooth trend, to several lags of itself, the ex-ante long-term
real interest rate and a transitory demand shock. The long-term real rate is determined
jointly by a term-structure relationship and the Fisher equation. The short-term nominal
interest rate is the instrument of monetary policy and changes in the latter aﬀect aggregate
demand through the impact on the ex ante long-term real interest rate.
The Smets-Wouters Model
The Smets-Wouters (SW) model (see Smets and Wouters, 2003) is an extended version of the
standard New-Keynesian DSGE closed-economy model with sticky prices and wages. The
model is estimated by Bayesian techniques using seven euro area macroeconomic time series:
real GDP, consumption, investment, employment, real wages, inﬂation and the nominal
short-term interest rate.
The model features three types of economic agents: households, ﬁrms and the monetary
policy authority. Households maximise a utility function with two arguments (goods and
leisure) over an inﬁnite life horizon. Consumption appears in the utility function relative to
a time-varying external habit-formation variable. Labour is diﬀerentiated over households,
so that there is some monopoly power over wages, which results in an explicit wage equation
and allows for the introduction of sticky nominal wages ` a la Calvo (1983). Households also
rent capital services to ﬁrms and decide how much capital to accumulate given certain
capital adjustment costs. As the rental price of capital goes up, the capital stock can be
used more intensively according to some cost schedule. Firms produce diﬀerentiated goods,
decide on labour and capital inputs, and set prices, again ` al aC a l v o .T h eC a l v om o d e li n
both wage and price setting is augmented by the assumption that those prices and wages
6See Coenen (2003) for an evaluation of the performance of monetary policy rules across the two variants
with Taylor and Fuhrer-Moore-type contracts, respectively. This paper shows that a cautious monetary
policy-maker is well-advised to design interest-rate policies under the assumption that the inﬂation process
is characterised by a high degree of persistence – as induced by Fuhrer-Moore-type contracts – when he is
faced with uncertainty about the prevailing degree of inﬂation persistence.
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function of current and expected real marginal cost, but are also inﬂuenced by past inﬂation.
Real marginal cost depends on wages and the rental rate of capital. The short-term nominal
interest rate is the instrument of monetary policy.7
The stochastic behaviour of the model is driven by ten exogenous shocks: ﬁve shocks
arising from technology and preferences, three cost-push shocks and two monetary-policy
shocks. The ﬁrst set of shocks is assumed to follow ﬁrst-order autoregressive processes,
whereas the second set is assumed to follow serially uncorrelated processes. Consistent with
the DSGE set up, potential output is deﬁned as the level of output that would prevail under
ﬂexible prices and wages in the absence of cost-push shocks.
The Area-Wide Model
The Area-Wide Model (AWM, see Fagan et al., 2001) is a medium-size structural macroeco-
nomic model that treats the euro area as a single economy.8 It has a long-run neo-classical
equilibrium with a vertical Phillips curve but with some short-run frictions in price and
wage setting and factor demands. Consequently, activity is demand-determined in the
short run but supply-determined in the long run. In the latter, employment converges to
a level consistent with the exogenously given level of equilibrium unemployment and fac-
tor demands are consistent with the solution of the ﬁrms’ proﬁt-maximisation problem.
Stock-ﬂow adjustments are accounted for by, for example, the inclusion of a wealth term
in consumption. At present, the treatment of expectations in the model is quite limited.
With the exception of the exchange rate (determined by uncovered interest parity) and
the long-term nominal interest rate (modelled by a term-structure relationship), the model
embodies backward-looking expectations.
As to the mechanisms through which monetary policy aﬀects the economy, aggregate
demand in the AWM is presently inﬂuenced only by short-term real interest rates. Long-
7Extending the study of Coenen (2003), Angeloni et al. (2003) utilise the SW model to analyse the design
of monetary policy when the monetary policy-maker is uncertain about the degree of nominal as well as real
persistence. The results of this analysis conﬁrm the conclusions of the earlier study.
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investment decisions. The expectations channel in principle allows monetary policy to
inﬂuence inﬂation via wage and price-setting behaviour. In addition to these inﬂuences,
further eﬀects enter through the exchange rate. Apart from an indirect eﬀect of exchange
rates on domestic demand, there is also a direct exchange-rate eﬀect on consumer price
inﬂation through the price for imported goods. The output gap is deﬁned as the ratio of
actual output to potential output, which is based on an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production
function with constant returns to scale and Hicks-neutral technical progress. For this,
trend total factor productivity has been estimated within-sample by applying the Hodrick-
Prescott ﬁlter to the Solow residual derived from the production function.
A Dis-aggregate Model of the Euro Area
The Dis-aggregate Model (DM) of the euro area used in Angelini et al. (2002) and Mon-
teforte and Siviero (2002) is a multi-country version of the simple backward-looking two-
equation model in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). It consists of an aggregate supply
equation and an aggregate demand equation for each of the three largest economies in the
euro area; i.e., Germany, France and Italy, which jointly account for over 70 per cent of euro
area GDP. The ﬁrst equation, interpretable as a Phillips curve, determines inﬂation in each
country as a function of lagged inﬂation and the output gap, as well as inﬂation ‘imported’
from the other two countries. The sum of the coeﬃcients on lagged and imported inﬂation
is constrained to equal unity (a restriction accepted by the data), so that a long-run verti-
cal Phillips curve exists for all countries. The second equation represents an IS curve and
relates the output gap of each country, modelled as the deviation of actual output from
a smooth trend, to its own lagged values, the short-term real interest rate, as well as the
output gaps in the other two countries (a design meant to capture the trade linkages among
euro area economies). Euro area inﬂation and the aggregate output gap are determined via
identities as weighted averages of the corresponding individual country variables. Finally,
the area-wide short-term nominal interest rate is the instrument of monetary policy.
As the model allows for simultaneous cross-country linkages, it was estimated with 3SLS
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signiﬁcant in all equations, resulting in a clear causal pattern, with the German economy
aﬀecting the other two comparatively more, and with the Italian economy being essentially
recursive. Furthermore, the estimation results indicate that there exists a signiﬁcant degree
of heterogeneity among the three economies included in the model.9 Accordingly, the results
in Angelini et al. (2002) suggest that monetary policy eﬀectiveness may be considerably
enhanced if country-speciﬁc information is used.
2.2 Diﬀerences in Monetary Policy Transmission
Figure 1 provides a comparison of the eﬀects of an unexpected one-quarter tightening of
monetary policy by 100 basis points in the four diﬀerent models of the euro area, with the
monetary policy-maker following the interest-rate rule proposed by Taylor (1993) thereafter.
Panel A of the ﬁgure depicts the dynamic responses of annual inﬂation and the output gap
for the largely forward-looking models (CW and SW), while panel B shows the responses
for the predominantly backward-looking models (AWM and DM).
Qualitatively, the tightening of policy has the same consequences in the four models. As
the short-term nominal interest rate rises unexpectedly, demand falls short of potential and
inﬂation falls below the monetary policy-maker’s target, with the dynamic adjustment being
drawn out lastingly. Quantitatively, however, the responses exhibit some noticeable diﬀer-
ences. Most importantly, the disinﬂation eﬀect is considerably larger and more persistent
in the backward-looking models with the timing of the peak eﬀect on inﬂation noticeably
delayed relative to that on the output gap. By contrast, in the forward-looking models
the timing of the peak eﬀect on inﬂation is much closer to that on the output gap with
the reversion to base of both inﬂation and the output gap being relatively more rapid and
smoother. Diﬀerences in the responses of the output gap, notably in the initial periods,
largely reﬂect diﬀerences in the employed output-gap concepts. Overall, this suggests that
the degree of forward-lookingness is of utmost relevance for explaining the diﬀerences in
9Monteforte and Siviero (2002) also report estimates of an aggregate companion of the DM (referred to
as Aggregate Model, AM, of the euro area), consisting of just two equations. Both statistical and economic
criteria indicate that the DM is to be preferred to the AM.
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April 2005Figure 1: Responses to an Interest-Rate Shock (100 Basis Points) under Taylor’s Rule
A. The Forward-Looking Euro Area Models
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inﬂation and output-gap dynamics across models.
Based on the documented patterns of the dynamic responses to the monetary policy
shock under Taylor’s rule, we summarise that a given interest-rate rule may perform quite
diﬀerently in terms of inﬂation and output-gap stabilisation, depending on the characteris-
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should be concerned about the design of the interest-rate rule to be used in model-based
analyses.
3 Evaluating the Performance of Interest-Rate Rules
We now proceed to describe the methodology which we will use to evaluate the stabilisation
performance of alternative monetary policies across our set of models of the euro area
economy. Our starting point is an evaluation of simple interest-rate rules which respond to
outcomes or forecasts of annual inﬂation and the output gap and allow for inertia due to
dependence on the lagged short-term nominal interest rate.
3.1 The Methodology
Following the approach in LWW (2003), we consider a three-parameter family of simple
interest-rate rules,
it = ρi t−1 +( 1− ρ)(r∗ +E t [˜ πt+θ ])+αEt [˜ πt+θ − π∗ ]+β Et [yt+κ ],
where it denotes the short-term nominal interest rate, r∗ is the equilibrium real interest
rate, ˜ πt = pt − pt−4 is the annual inﬂation rate, π∗ denotes the monetary policy-maker’s
inﬂation target, and yt is the output gap.10 Under rational expectations, the operator Et[·]
indicates the model-consistent forecast of a particular variable, using information available
in period t.11 The integer parameters θ and κ denote the length of the forecast horizons for
inﬂation and the output gap, respectively. This speciﬁcation accommodates forecast-based
rules (with forecast horizons θ,κ > 0) as well as outcome-based rules (θ = κ =0 )a n d
simpliﬁes to the one proposed by Taylor (1993) if θ = κ =0 ,ρ = 0 and α = β =0 .5.12
10Even in the case where the multi-country model DM is used, both inﬂation and the output gap are
to be interpreted as area-wide variables, reﬂecting the assumption that the policy-maker is concerned with
area-wide developments.
11We employ the AIM algorithm of Anderson and Moore (1985), which uses the Blanchard and Kahn
(1980) method for solving linear rational expectations models, to compute model-consistent expectations.
12In the special case with ρ = 1, the rule represents a ﬁrst-diﬀerence rule, a class of rules which LWW
(2003) advocate as being robust when examining the performance of simple interest-rate rules across a set
of distinct models of the U.S. economy, none of them being fully backward-looking though. Orphanides and
Williams (2002) emphasise that ﬁrst-diﬀerence rules are also robust to mis-perceptions about the equilibrium
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rate rules is deﬁned by the response coeﬃcients ρ, α and β. The coeﬃcients α and β
represent the policy-maker’s short-term reaction to inﬂation in deviation from target and
the output gap, respectively, while ρ determines the inertia of the interest-rate response,
commonly interpreted as the desired degree of policy ‘smoothing’. The latter plays an
important role for model-based evaluations of interest-rate rules. In particular, the degree to
which the optimal policy in any given model embodies smoothing tends to depend largely on
the expectation formation mechanism embedded in that model. Typically, if expectations
are backward looking, values of ρ at or above unity can perform poorly since they may
engender un-dampened oscillations in the model economy due to instrument instability (see,
e.g., Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999, and Batini and Nelson, 2001). By contrast, models
with largely forward-looking expectations, notably small optimising New-Keynesian models,
tend to favour a comparatively high degree of smoothing because the inertial adjustment
of the short-term interest rate enables the policy-maker to steer expectations and thereby
to stabilise the economy more eﬀectively.
In our evaluation of the stabilisation performance of variants of the above family of
interest-rate rules, we assume that the monetary policy-maker has a standard loss function
equal to the weighted sum of the unconditional variances of inﬂation, the output gap and
changes in the short-term nominal interest rate,
L = Var[πt ]+λVar[ yt ]+µVar[ ∆it ].
Here, inﬂation is measured by the annualised one-quarter inﬂation rate, πt =4( pt − pt−1).
The weight λ ≥ 0 refers to the policy-maker’s preference for reducing output variability
relative to inﬂation variability, and the weight µ ≥ 0 on the variability of changes in the
short-term nominal interest rate, ∆it = it − it−1, reﬂects a desire to avoid undue ﬂuc-
tuations in the nominal interest rate itself.13 Establishing this loss function is consistent
13For an explicit derivation of the policy-maker’s loss function L from quadratic intertemporal preferences
the reader is referred to Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). In Svensson’s terminology, the case of λ = µ =0
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tion target π∗ and actual output around potential, with the concern regarding excessive
interest-rate variability typically justiﬁed by ﬁnancial stability considerations.14
For ﬁxed inﬂation and output-gap forecast horizons θ and κ, the three-parameter fam-
ily of interest-rate rules deﬁned above is optimised by minimising the policy-maker’s loss
function L with respect to the coeﬃcients ρ, α and β. In this context, we repeatedly need
to compute the unconditional variances of the models’ endogenous variables for a given
interest-rate rule. In preparation for these computations, we ﬁrst identify the series of
historical shocks that would be consistent with the alternative models under rational ex-
pectations. Based on the covariance matrix of the historical shocks, it is then possible to
calculate the unconditional covariance matrix of the endogenous variables for any given
interest-rate rule by applying standard methods to the reduced-form solution of the model
including that rule.15
In the subsequent analysis, we will consider four alternative values for the relative weight
on output-gap variability, namely λ =0 , 1/3, 1 and 3. Regarding the weight on the vari-
ability of interest-rate changes, we will concentrate the analysis on a ﬁxed value of µ =0 .10.
We shall brieﬂy discuss additional results for a lower weight of µ =0 .01 in the sensitivity
analysis towards the end of paper. There, we will also report on results for interest-rate
rules which only allow for a response to lagged inﬂation and the lagged output gap; that
is, with θ = κ = −1. Such rules have been proposed as a proxy for actual policy-making in
‘real time’ (see McCallum, 1988).
3.2 The Performance of Optimised Benchmark Rules
As benchmarks for evaluating the performance of simple interest-rate rules across our set of
models, we focus on two types of rules: outcome-based rules with θ = κ = 0, and forecast-
14It is recognised that it would be beneﬁcial to use a welfare criterion derived as an approximation of
the representative agent’s utility function (see for example Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997). The weights
in this approximate welfare criterion would be functions of the parameters of the structural model itself.
However, to the extent that the models used in this paper, with the exception of the SW model, are lacking
micro-foundations, a well-deﬁned welfare criterion does not exist.
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A. The Forward-Looking Euro Area Models
CW SW
θκλ ρ α β L %∆L ραβ L %∆L
0 0 0 0.97 0.81 0.10 1.8 2 1.03 0.81 0.08 1.0 3
1/3 0.81 0.49 0.86 2.5 5 1.00 0.64 1.53 1.3 8
1 0.79 0.30 1.55 3.2 4 0.99 0.43 3.05 1.5 6
3 0.77 0.23 2.50 4.7 3 0.92 0.11 5.87 1.7 5
4 0 0 1.59 4.36 -0.25 1.9 5 1.96 6.59 -0.05 1.0 6
1/3 0.83 1.18 0.84 2.6 6 1.01 1.19 1.50 1.3 9
1 0.79 0.76 1.55 3.2 4 1.00 0.79 2.99 1.5 7
3 0.77 0.59 2.49 4.6 3 0.99 0.53 5.64 1.7 5
B. The Backward-Looking Euro Area Models
AWM DM
θκλ ρ α β L %∆L ραβ L %∆L
0 0 0 0.44 1.14 1.13 1.3 26 0.31 5.81 3.65 6.0 54
1/3 0.39 0.93 2.37 1.9 20 0.28 5.78 3.89 6.9 53
1 0.44 0.65 3.69 2.6 18 0.25 5.71 4.26 8.5 51
3 0.50 0.40 5.79 3.8 15 0.19 5.59 5.01 12.5 47
4 0 0 0.47 2.22 0.55 1.2 15 0.55 3.99 0.56 4.6 20
1/3 0.37 2.47 1.67 1.8 13 0.51 4.06 0.74 5.4 21
1 0.39 2.49 3.00 2.5 12 0.46 4.18 1.05 6.9 23
3 0.42 2.38 5.12 3.7 11 0.36 4.39 1.75 10.6 24
Notes: For each choice of the inﬂation and output-gap forecast horizons (θ and κ), for each preference
parameter (λ) and for each model, this table indicates the optimised interest-rate response coeﬃcients (ρ,
α and β), the value of the policy-maker’s loss function (L) and the percentage-point diﬀerence of the latter
from the loss under the fully optimal policy (%∆L).
based rules which relate the interest rate to the one-year-ahead forecast of inﬂation and the
contemporaneous output gap with θ = 4 and κ =0 .
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four diﬀerent models of the euro area economy and for alternative values of the preference
parameter λ, together with an indication of their stabilisation performance. The latter is
measured by the value of the policy-maker’s loss function yielded under the rule optimised
for a particular model, L, and alternatively, in relative terms, as the percentage-point
diﬀerence of the loss under the optimised rule from the loss under the fully optimal policy
for that model, %∆L.16,17 Panel A in Table 1 indicates the results for the largely forward-
looking models (CW and SW), while panel B shows the results for the predominantly
backward-looking models (AWM and DM).
We start with the results for the forward-looking models in panel A, and observe that,
regardless of the policy-maker’s preference for output stabilisation, the optimised rules
are characterised by a substantial degree of interest-rate smoothing, as captured by the
high coeﬃcient on the lagged interest rate, ρ. Interestingly, with a low weight on output
stabilisation and, in particular, with the inﬂation forecast horizon extending one year into
the future, the magnitude of ρ tends to exceed unity, notably for the SW model. This
feature is commonly referred to as ‘super-inertia’ in the interest rate. Not surprisingly,
as the weight on output stabilisation increases, the coeﬃcient on the output gap, β,r i s e s
while the coeﬃcient on inﬂation, α, falls. As regards the stabilisation performance of the
optimised interest-rate rules, we observe that the implied values of the policy-maker’s loss
function are typically somewhat larger in the CW model, possibly reﬂecting a less dominant
role for the expectations channel in transmitting monetary policy to aggregate demand. At
the same time, for both models the performance of monetary policy deteriorates fairly little
when the policy-maker follows a relatively simple optimised interest-rate rule rather than
the fully optimal policy. The value of the policy-maker’s loss function never rises by more
than 9 percentage points. We also observe that there is no discernible stabilisation gain
from following forecast-based as opposed to outcome-based rules.
16For the CW and SW models, as well as the AWM, the fully optimal policy corresponds to the optimal
policy under commitment. See Finan and Tetlow (1999) for details on computing the optimal policy under
commitment for large rational expectations models using AIM.
17Details regarding the unconditional variability of the individual target variables underlying the calcula-
tion of the loss function, L, can be found in Table A of the appendix.
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worthy. First, the optimised interest-rate rules embody only a mild degree of smoothing,
with ρ varying between 0.4 and 0.5 for the AWM and between 0.2 and 0.6 for the DM. This
discrepancy largely reﬂects the fact that expectations, notably those determining long-term
interest rates, do not play a dominant role in either model. Thus, there is no scope for
increasing the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy by an inertial adjustment of the short-term
rate. Second, the optimised response coeﬃcients α and β are typically quite a bit larger
than for the forward-looking models, in particular for the DM. This mirrors the fact that,
in backward-looking models, inﬂation and the output gap are much harder to stabilise and
that, as a result, the policy-maker has to respond more aggressively to any signs of rising
inﬂation and cumulating output gaps. Third, when compared with the outcomes under the
fully optimal policies, the stabilisation performance of simple interest-rate rules deteriorates
quite substantially, albeit less strongly for the AWM. In the extreme case when the policy-
maker does not attach any weight to output stabilisation, the loss under the optimised
outcome-based rule exceeds the loss associated with the fully optimal policy by more than
50 percentage points for the DM, while the loss diﬀers by about 25 percentage points for
the AWM.18 In the case of the AWM, the relatively poor performance of simple optimised
rules is likely due to the model’s fairly high degree of structural detail and its rather com-
plex dynamics (see Finan and Tetlow, 1999, for a similar observation based on the Federal
Reserve Board’s FRB/U.S. model).19 Similarly, the DM departs from the rest of the models
to the extent that it is the only model in which the three largest euro area economies are
modelled separately. Fourth, contrary to the results for the forward-looking models, there
are substantial gains in performance from using forecast-based rather than outcome-based
18Evidently, while the values of the loss function obtained for the AWM are comparable with those yielded
in the forward-looking models, the losses for the DM are quite a bit larger.
19Giannoni and Woodford (2002) show that the fully optimal policy for a model, regardless of its degree of
structural detail, can be represented as a generalised Taylor rule, in which the relation between the interest-
rate instrument and the other target variables includes leads and lags of the target variables. Therefore,
the relatively poor performance of the simple interest-rate rules examined here ought to be mitigated by
the inclusion of additional leads and lags of the inﬂation rate, the output gap and the interest rate. In fact,
Williams (2003) shows for the FRB/U.S. model that moderately more complicated Taylor-type interest-rate
rule which respond to a slightly enhanced number of lags of the target variables yield noticeable, albeit fairly
small stabilisation gains over optimised three-parameter rules.
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points for the DM (in the case of λ = 0). We attribute these improvements in performance
to the information-encompassing nature of forecast-based rules, with the inﬂation forecast
incorporating information about incipient risks to future inﬂation arising from a possibly
larger set of underlying determinants (see Batini and Haldane, 1999) and the transmission
lag of monetary policy (see Batini and Nelson, 2001).
4 Evaluating the Robustness of Interest-Rate Rules
In the previous section, we implicitly assumed that the policy-maker knows the ‘true’ model
of the euro area economy when optimising variants of the three-parameter family of interest-
rate rules for any given model. While the optimised rules typically succeeded in stabilising
inﬂation and output satisfactorily for that given model, we now proceed to analyse to which
extent the optimised rules are robust to model uncertainty, in the sense of performing also
reasonably well across the other, possibly competing models of the euro area.
4.1 The Performance of Optimised Rules across Models
Table 2 summarises our ﬁndings regarding the stabilisation performance of the optimised
benchmark rules documented in Table 1 above across our set of models. Here, performance
is measured by the value of the policy-maker’s loss function, L, and by the percentage-point
diﬀerence of the latter from the loss under the fully optimal policy, %∆L, when the rule
optimised for any particular model m is evaluated in the possibly competing model n  = m.
Panel A in Table 2 reports the ﬁndings for the rules optimised for the forward-looking
models, while panel B documents those for the backward-looking ones.
Beginning with the rules optimised for the forward-looking models in panel A, we observe
that rules which are optimised for the CW model also perform satisfactorily when evaluated
in the SW model, and vice versa. For example, with θ = κ = 0 and λ =1 /3, implementing
the CW-based rule in the SW model leads to an increase in the loss function of about 15
percentage points, relative to the loss associated with the fully optimal policy for the SW
model. When compared to the performance of the interest-rate rule optimised for the SW
22
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 479
April 2005Table 2: The Robustness of Optimised Interest-Rate Rules in Models of the Euro Area
A. Rules Optimised for the Forward-Looking Euro Area Models
Rules optimised for CW Rules optimised for SW
L %∆LL%∆L
θκλ SW AWM DM SW AWM DM CW AWM DM CW AWM DM
0 0 0 1.0 ∞∞ 6 ∞∞ 1.9 ∞∞ 3 ∞∞
1/3 1.4 2.5 35.1 15 56 684 2.7 4.8 23.2 13 202 419
1 1.6 3.4 465.6 18 54 8228 3.7 4.6 59.8 23 110 969
3 2.0 5.2 ∞ 25 58 ∞ 6.2 6.1 ∞ 38 85 ∞
4 0 0 1.0 ∞∞ 9 ∞∞ 1.9 ∞∞ 6 ∞∞
1/3 1.4 2.4 11.4 15 52 155 2.8 5.2 ∞ 14 232 ∞
1 1.6 3.2 23.3 17 45 318 3.7 4.9 67.4 23 122 1106
3 2.0 5.0 73.3 25 51 763 6.4 5.7 ∞ 43 72 ∞
B. Rules Optimised for the Backward-Looking Euro Area Models
Rules optimised for AWM Rules optimised for DM
L %∆LL%∆L
θκλ CW SW DM CW SW DM CW SW AWM CW SW AWM
0 0 0 2.2 1.3 48.6 20 36 1157 3.4 1.4 2.0 87 56 94
1/3 2.7 1.5 222.2 11 24 4859 3.8 1.7 2.3 58 39 43
1 3.5 1.7 ∞ 14 23 ∞ 4.7 2.2 2.7 53 55 24
3 ME 2.0 ∞ ME 23 ∞ 6.8 3.2 3.9 52 97 17
4 0 0 2.3 1.3 11.8 25 40 205 2.5 1.3 1.3 40 37 27
1/3 2.7 1.6 15.2 13 30 238 2.8 1.7 2.1 16 35 30
1 3.4 1.8 20.2 13 31 261 3.7 2.3 3.1 20 64 41
3 5.2 2.1 34.3 16 31 303 5.8 3.6 5.2 29 120 56
Notes: For each choice of the inﬂation and output-gap forecast horizons (θ and κ), for each preference
parameter (λ) and for each model, this table indicates the value of the policy-maker’s loss function (L)
and the percentage-point diﬀerence of the latter from the loss under the fully optimal policy (%∆L), when
the rule optimised for model m is evaluated in model n  = m. The notation “ME” indicates that the
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when implementing the SW-based rule in the CW model the increase in the loss function
amounts to 13 and 8 percentage points, depending on the benchmark for comparison. By
contrast, when evaluating the CW and SW-based rules in the backward-looking models,
the performance of monetary policy tends to deteriorate quite substantially. For the AWM,
the loss increases by about 50 percentage points relative to the fully optimal policy when
CW-based rules are implemented and by more than 100 percentage points on average for
SW-based rules. The deterioration is found to be particularly dramatic if the policy-maker
puts zero weight on output stabilisation since the CW and SW-based rules do not succeed
in stabilising the AWM any longer. Finally, when evaluated in the DM, the performance of
CW and SW-based rules is even worse, generating even higher increases in relative losses
and resulting in instability more often.
Turning to the rules optimised for the backward-looking models in panel B, we observe
that the AWM-based rules typically result in reasonable stabilisation outcomes when eval-
uated in the CW or the SW model. The exception is the outcome-based rule for λ =3
which yields multiple equilibria when implemented in the CW model. By contrast, the
AWM-based rules do not perform satisfactorily in the DM and may occasionally even gen-
erate instability. Finally, the DM-based rules result in a substantial deterioration in the
performance of monetary policy when evaluated in any of the three other models, although
the deterioration exceeds 100 percentage points only in exceptional cases. Interestingly, for
forecast-based rules the deterioration is found to be somewhat more benign.
Based on these results, we conclude that simple interest-rate rules that are designed for
the predominantly backward-looking euro area models tend to perform reasonably well in
the largely forward-looking models, while the reverse is not necessarily true.20 The fault-
tolerance analysis undertaken in the next section will help to cast some further light on the
reasons underlying these ﬁndings.
20It is interesting to note that the aggregate companion of the DM (AM; see footnote 9) demands policies
that are closer to those obtained for the AWM (the other predominantly backward-looking model), suggesting
that the choice of the degree of aggregation is also a relevant factor in shaping the results.
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Fault-tolerance analysis of optimised interest-rate rules, as proposed by LW (2003), is
deemed to provide useful insights into the reasons that underlie our earlier ﬁndings. Fault-
tolerance analysis is a concept borrowed from engineering and involves, in the present
context, appraising the increase in the loss function that results when a single parameter
of an optimised interest-rate rule is varied, holding the other parameters constant at their
optimised values. A highly fault tolerant model is one for which the parameters of the rule
may vary over a relatively broad range of values without resulting in a large deterioration
of its performance. By contrast, an intolerant model would be a model whose performance
deteriorates dramatically as soon as one deviates even modestly from some optimised pa-
rameter value (i.e., the loss function exhibits strong curvature with respect to sub-optimal
variations in some parameter). Clearly, if one is dealing with a set of relatively tolerant
models, there is a fair chance to ﬁnd a robust policy rule. If all models are intolerant, then
a robust rule may not exist.
Figure 2 depicts the fault tolerances of our four models for the case θ = κ = 0 and
λ =1 /3 (i.e., for the outcome-based rules obtained with a moderate weight on output
stabilisation).21 Each curve shows the percentage-point change in the policy-maker’s loss
function under the optimised rule as a single parameter is varied, with its minimum of zero
attained at the optimised value itself. As can be seen in the ﬁgure, while any single parame-
ter may be varied over a relatively broad range of values without deteriorating dramatically
the performance of the individual model concerned, there are no obvious overlapping re-
gions of high mutual fault tolerance for all four models under examination and for all three
policy-rule parameters at the same time.
Regarding the fault tolerances with respect to the smoothing coeﬃcient ρ (displayed in
the upper panel of the ﬁgure), the two forward-looking models perform best when ρ is close
to unity, while the performance for both the AWM and DM deteriorates quite markedly
in this region, eventually resulting in instrument instability for the DM. In contrast, the
21For other values of the preference parameter λ the results are qualitatively similar.
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April 2005Figure 2: Fault-Tolerance Analysis of Outcome-Based Interest-Rate Rules
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Fault Tolerence (%  ∆L) w.r.t. Coefficient on Output Gap ( β )
Notes: For λ =1 /3 and for each model, the ﬁgure indicates the percentage-point change in the policy-
maker’s loss function (%∆L) under the optimised outcome-based interest-rate rule (θ = κ =0 )a sas i n g l e
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of about 0.25. Values of ρ in this region, however, tend to yield indeterminate equilibria
for the forward-looking models, notably for the CW model. With respect to the response
coeﬃcient α (depicted in the middle panel), the forward-looking models and the AWM seem
mutually tolerant to variations in α in the region of close to 0 to 2.5. The DM, however,
behaves very diﬀerently in its optimal prescription for α, demanding a signiﬁcantly higher
value of about 6, with the curvature of the loss function in that region being modest though.
By contrast, as shown in the lower panel, a comfortable region of relatively high mutual
tolerance seems to exist with respect to variations in the response coeﬃcient β in the range
of 2 to 4. While the DM favours a strong response to the output gap in the range of 2 to
7.5, the three other models perform satisfactorily as a group for coeﬃcients in the range of
0.5 to 4, with the CW model constraining the upper bound of this range.
Interestingly, as shown in Figure 3, the four models exhibit considerably larger regions
of mutual fault tolerance when the policy-maker follows a forecast-based rule with θ =4
and κ = 0. In this case, variations in ρ in the range of 0.4 to 0.7 result in a reasonable
performance of all four models. Similarly, there are regions of mutual tolerance with respect
to variations in α and β, the regions being centred at 3.5 and 1, respectively.
5 Designing Robust Interest-Rate Rules
The fault-tolerance analysis in the previous section has provided an indication under which
circumstances a robust interest-rate rule might exist for our set of euro area models. How-
ever, to the extent that fault-tolerance analysis rests on sub-optimal variations in a single
policy-rule parameter, holding ﬁxed the other parameters at their optimised values, we ﬁ-
nally proceed to use a more formal approach that allows taking into account the interaction
amongst all policy-rule parameters to identify the operating characteristics of interest-rules
that are likely to yield satisfactory outcomes across our models.
In search of such robust rules we follow the Bayesian approach outlined in LWW (1999,
2003) and optimise the response coeﬃcients of the three-parameter family of interest-rate
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April 2005Figure 3: Fault-Tolerance Analysis of Forecast-Based Interest-Rate Rules
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Notes: For λ =1 /3 and for each model, the ﬁgure indicates the percentage-point change in the policy-
maker’s loss function (%∆L) under the optimised forecast-based interest-rate rule (θ =4 ,κ =0 )a sa
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where ωm denotes the weight attached to any given model m ∈M⊆{ CW, SW,
AWM, DM} with ωm > 0a n d

ωm =1 . F o rωm =1 /|M|, the average loss function
corresponds to the policy-maker’s expected loss function when he has uniform prior beliefs
as to which model in M is a plausible representation of the euro area economy.
Panel A of Table 3 reports the response coeﬃcients of outcome and forecast-based rules
that are optimised across all four models simultaneously assuming uniform prior beliefs and
indicates the performance of these rules yielded in the individual models. Here, performance
is measured as the contributions of the individual models to the value of the policy-maker’s
overall loss function, Lm, and as the percentage-point diﬀerence of these contributions from
the losses under the fully optimal policies, %∆Lm.
Starting with the outcome-based rules with θ = κ = 0 it turns out that the jointly
optimised, that is, Bayesian robust policies are heavily weighted towards those demanded
by the DM, with the optimised interest-rate response coeﬃcients close to those implied by
the DM alone (see Table 1 above). Speciﬁcally, the Bayesian robust policies prescribe a
degree of interest-rate smoothing in the range of 0.5 to 0.6, while the responses to inﬂation
and the output gap are rather aggressive. The response to inﬂation is relatively stable at
around 3, while the response to the output gap varies quite a bit, namely in the range of 2 to
4, depending on the weight given to output stabilisation. In the light of the fault-tolerance
analysis reported above, this outcome is not really surprising, since, in the absence of
regions of high mutual tolerance with respect to some parameter, the least tolerant model is
supposed to be most inﬂuential in shaping the operating characteristics of the robust policy
with respect to that parameter.22 Nevertheless, the robust policies perform reasonably
22In fact, the DM is rather intolerant to non-trivial deviations from the optimised coeﬃcients implied by
the DM alone, as can be seen in Figure 2. Further to this, the decisive role of the DM in our Bayesian
analysis, after all, relates to the fact that the baseline level of the loss for the DM is relatively high when
compared with the baseline losses for the other models.
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Lm generated in %∆Lm generated in
θκλ ρ α β CW SW AWM DM CW SW AWM DM
A. Optimisation across All Models
0 0 0 0.54 3.38 2.28 2.6 1.3 1.6 6.4 46 38 58 64
1/3 0.58 3.22 2.71 3.1 1.5 2.3 7.2 28 22 46 60
1 0.58 3.21 3.33 3.9 1.8 3.2 8.8 28 30 45 58
3 0.54 3.33 4.48 5.8 2.4 4.8 13.2 29 50 47 56
4 0 0 0.60 3.28 0.49 2.3 1.2 1.3 4.7 26 33 25 22
1/3 0.62 3.27 1.16 2.7 1.5 2.0 5.7 11 22 25 28
1 0.60 3.46 1.90 3.4 1.8 2.7 7.5 10 29 25 34
3 0.54 3.76 3.16 5.0 2.3 4.1 12.1 11 42 24 43
B. Optimisation across All Aggregate Models
0 0 0 0.71 0.76 0.55 2.1 1.1 1.4 14 24 33
1/3 0.63 0.64 1.72 2.6 1.4 2.0 8 17 24
1 0.64 0.42 2.78 3.3 1.6 2.7 8 17 22
3 0.64 0.37 4.37 5.0 1.9 4.0 10 18 20
4 0 0 0.72 1.26 0.39 2.2 1.2 1.2 20 29 20
1/3 0.64 1.40 1.46 2.6 1.5 1.9 8 19 17
1 0.62 1.38 2.56 3.3 1.7 2.6 8 19 17
3 0.62 1.42 4.17 4.9 2.0 3.8 9 20 16
Notes: For each choice of the inﬂation and output-gap forecast horizons (θ and κ) and for each preference
parameter (λ), this table indicates the jointly optimised interest-rate response coeﬃcients (ρ, α and β), the
contribution of the individual model m to the policy-maker’s loss function (Lm) and the percentage-point
diﬀerence of this contribution from the loss under the fully optimal policy (%∆Lm).
well in all four models, notably if a sensible weight is given to output-gap stabilisation, as
can be seen when comparing the outcomes under the robust policies with the performance
measures reported in Table 1 above. In fact, the increase in the reported losses never
exceeds 50 percentage points, even if the sole policy objective is to stabilise inﬂation (i.e.,
for λ = 0), with the deterioration in performance obviously smallest for the DM due to its
inﬂuential role in shaping the operating characteristics of the robust policies. This ﬁnding is
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economy including the backward-looking model of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). Also
in this study the contours of the robust policies are found to be heavily weighted towards
those demanded by the backward-looking model.
Turning to the forecast-based rules with θ = 4 and κ = 0, the performance of Bayesian
robust policies is found to be even more satisfactory across models. Yet again, this ﬁnding
is not surprising in the light of the fault-tolerance analysis above indicating the existence of
regions of relatively high mutual tolerance for all three parameters. However, the optimised
parameters of the robust rules appear to be largely inﬂuenced by the DM again.
To the extent that the robust policies for the full set of models are heavily weighted
towards the policies demanded by the DM, panel B of Table 3 also reports results obtained
when optimising across all aggregate models, but excluding the DM. In this case, the robust
policies are characterised by a uniformly higher degree of interest-rate smoothing (in a range
of 0.6 to 0.7) and, overall, by less aggressive responses to inﬂation and the output gap.
As expected, the performance of the robust policies designed for the two forward-looking
models (CW and SW) and the AWM alone appears more favourable across these models
when compared to the performance under the robust rules designed for the full set of models.
6 Sensitivity Analysis
Now we brieﬂy summarise some additional sensitivity analysis regarding the results pre-
sented above. First, we consider the implications of changing the weight µ on the variabil-
ity of interest-rate changes in the policy-maker’s loss function. For the preceding analysis
we have chosen a weight of µ =0 .1 which has been widely employed in policy evaluation
exercises like ours. As shown in Table B-1 in the appendix, with a weight of µ =0 .01
on interest-rate variability, the relative stabilisation performance of optimised rules is not
signiﬁcantly aﬀected when compared to the baseline results reported in Table 1 above.
However, with the variability in interest-rate changes penalised less, there are a number of
noticeable diﬀerences with regard to the pattern of the optimised coeﬃcients. First, the
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the backward-looking models the optimal degree of interest-rate smoothing is found to be
even lower. However, despite these changes in the operating characteristics of the optimised
rules, we observe, by comparing the relative performance measures reported in Table B-2
with those in Table 2, that the robustness properties of the optimised rules are broadly
unaﬀected if the weight on interest-rate variability is lowered to µ =0 .01. Finally, as docu-
mented in Table B-3, jointly optimised interest-rate rules are yet again found to be weighted
towards the DM, with the relatively favourable performance of robust forecast-based rules
being less clear-cut though.
Regarding the sensitivity of our results with respect to using a ‘real-time’ information
set with θ = κ = −1, Table C-1 shows that the performance of real-time-based rules tends to
deteriorate relative to that of outcome-based rules. For the more backward-looking models,
this deterioration is rather pronounced (up to 69 and 34 percentage points for the AWM
and the DM, respectively, depending on the weight given to output stabilisation). Similarly,
as shown in Table C-2, the robustness of real-time-based rules tends to be inferior to that
of outcome-based ones, resulting in a somewhat larger deterioration of performance across
models. Finally, as indicated in Table C-3, the performance of robust real-time-based rules
is slightly inferior across models as well.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we examined the performance and robustness of optimised interest-rate rules
in four models of the euro area which diﬀer considerably in terms of size, degree of aggrega-
tion, relevance of forward-looking behavioural elements and adherence to micro-foundations.
Based on our examination, we conclude that simple interest-rate rules that are optimised
for a given model may perform satisfactorily in models with a not too dissimilar structure
but may result in a dramatic deterioration of performance in models with markedly dif-
ferent features. In particular, rules that are designed for largely forward-looking models
tend to perform poorly in predominantly backward-looking models, although the reverse
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istics of interest-rate rules that are optimised across our set of models simultaneously are
heavily weighted towards those required by the backward-looking models. Nevertheless,
the Bayesian robust policies identiﬁed in such a way perform reasonably well in all four
models, notably if a sensible weight is given to output stabilisation. Especially, we ﬁnd
that a forecast-based rule which relates the short-term interest rate to the one-year ahead
forecast of inﬂation and the contemporaneous output gap and, importantly, which allows
for only a moderate degree of inertia attains reasonable outcomes.
While other model features such as variable and country coverage and adherence to
micro-foundations are apparently of relevance as well, the nature of the expectation for-
mation mechanism embedded in the various models seems to be of key importance for
explaining our results. This in turn suggests that future research that aims at casting
light on the empirical relevance of forward-looking behavioural elements in macroeconomic
models may enhance the reliability and usefulness of interest-rate rules for model-based
evaluations of monetary policy. Of course, in the case that a policy rule prescribed to set
the interest rate in response to forecasts of future inﬂation, we assumed in our analysis
that these forecasts happened to be consistent with the structure of the particular model in
which the performance of the forecast-based rule was evaluated. Similarly, the measure of
the output gap used when evaluating the rule was consistent with the output-gap concept
employed in that particular model. To the extent that the monetary policy-maker faces un-
certainty regarding the reliability of the inﬂation forecast itself or the correct measurement
of the output gap these additional sources of uncertainty may heighten the risks associated
with relying too heavily on a rule optimised for any particular model.23 Extensions of our
study along these directions are left for future research.
23Indeed, the analysis in Coenen (2003) shows that erroneously relying on the false forecasting model may
result in a signiﬁcant deterioration of the stabilisation performance of a forecast-based rule, even when the
rule itself is designed under the assumption that the structure of the economy is known. The consequences of
relying on alternative, possibly inconsistent output-gap concepts is analysed in Smets and Wouters (2002).
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Table A: Detailed Results for the Optimised Interest-Rate Rules
A. The Forward-Looking Euro Area Models
CW SW
θκλ σ π σy σ∆i L σπ σy σ∆i L
0 0 0 1.33 2.30 0.80 1.83 0.93 2.47 0.47 0.95
1/3 1.45 1.07 0.82 2.54 1.06 0.60 0.87 1.33
1 1.48 0.91 1.26 3.17 1.08 0.40 1.21 1.48
3 1.48 0.83 1.93 4.65 1.09 0.28 1.68 1.71
4 0 0 1.35 2.09 0.79 1.89 0.94 2.44 0.51 0.98
1/3 1.47 1.02 0.83 2.58 1.07 0.58 0.87 1.34
1 1.48 0.90 1.26 3.18 1.08 0.40 1.21 1.48
3 1.49 0.83 1.91 4.65 1.09 0.29 1.64 1.70
B. The Backward-Looking Euro Area Models
AWM DM
θκλ σ π σy σ∆i L σπ σy σ∆i L
0 0 0 1.09 1.57 1.04 1.30 2.15 1.68 3.69 5.97
1/3 1.07 1.17 1.74 1.90 2.17 1.60 3.62 6.86
1 1.07 0.91 2.50 2.59 2.22 1.50 3.59 8.45
3 1.07 0.69 3.52 3.79 2.36 1.36 3.68 12.48
4 0 0 1.04 1.59 1.01 1.19 1.89 1.58 3.29 4.64
1/3 1.02 1.16 1.69 1.78 1.90 1.51 3.24 5.44
1 1.03 0.90 2.43 2.46 1.95 1.43 3.23 6.87
3 1.04 0.69 3.42 3.65 2.07 1.31 3.34 10.56
Notes: For each choice of the inﬂation and output-gap forecast horizons (θ and κ), for each preference
parameter (λ) and for each model, this table indicates the unconditional standard deviations of the target
variables (σπ, σy and σ∆i) and the value of the policy-maker’s loss function (L).
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April 2005Table B-1: The Stabilisation Performance of Optimised Interest-Rate Rules Generated with
aL o w e rW e i g h to fµ =0 .01 on Interest-Rate Variability
A. The Forward-Looking Euro Area Models
CW SW
θκλ ρ α β L %∆L ραβ L %∆L
0 0 0 0.98 2.98 0.25 1.7 1 1.03 1.71 0.16 0.9 2
1/3 0.75 1.26 2.29 2.4 5 0.99 1.92 5.25 1.2 9
1 0.73 0.74 4.09 2.9 4 1.02 0.83 11.22 1.3 6
3 0.69 0.44 6.54 4.0 3 1.00 0.84 20.93 1.3 4
4 0 0 2.75 29.26 -0.24 1.7 5 2.32 18.26 -0.06 0.9 4
1/3 0.79 3.30 2.14 2.5 7 1.01 3.40 4.73 1.2 9
1 0.73 1.96 4.14 2.9 4 1.00 2.49 10.32 1.3 7
3 0.68 1.33 6.62 4.0 3 1.00 1.72 20.42 1.3 4
B. The Backward-Looking Euro Area Models
AWM DM
θκλ ρ α β L %∆L ραβ L %∆L
0 0 0 0.17 3.05 3.00 1.1 24 0.11 13.83 8.33 3.8 41
1/3 0.42 2.03 6.57 1.4 12 0.02 13.24 9.11 4.8 42
1 0.51 1.37 9.71 1.6 9 0.00 11.88 9.65 6.4 42
3 0.55 0.84 14.55 2.0 6 0.00 9.94 10.22 10.4 41
4 0 0 0.23 6.76 1.16 1.0 11 0.39 10.58 1.53 2.9 9
1/3 0.30 5.57 4.69 1.3 5 0.27 10.43 2.30 3.8 12
1 0.37 4.53 8.08 1.6 4 0.15 10.28 3.33 5.2 16
3 0.44 3.53 13.10 2.0 4 0.00 9.83 5.12 8.8 19
Notes: For each choice of the inﬂation and output-gap forecast horizons (θ and κ), for each preference
parameter (λ) and for each model, this table indicates the optimised interest-rate response coeﬃcients (ρ,
α and β), the value of the policy-maker’s loss function (L) and the percentage-point diﬀerence of the latter
from the loss under the fully optimal policy (%∆L).
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April 2005Table B-2: The Robustness of Optimised Interest-Rate Rules Generated with a Lower
Weight of µ =0 .01 on Interest-Rate Variability
A. Rules Optimised for the Forward-Looking Euro Area Models
Rules optimised for CW Rules optimised for SW
L %∆LL%∆L
θκλ SW AWM DM SW AWM DM CW AWM DM CW AWM DM
0 0 0 0.9 ∞∞ 3 ∞∞ 1.7 ∞∞ 4 ∞∞
1/3 1.3 1.7 17.6 12 36 420 2.6 1.7 ∞ 13 34 ∞
1 1.4 1.9 97.4 13 29 2046 3.6 1.9 ∞ 31 29 ∞
3 1.5 2.5 ∞ 17 30 ∞ 6.5 2.2 ∞ 67 16 ∞
4 0 0 0.9 ∞∞ 4 ∞∞ 1.7 ∞∞ 6 ∞∞
1/3 1.3 1.6 27.3 12 30 704 2.6 1.8 ∞ 13 43 ∞
1 1.3 1.8 30.3 12 21 567 3.5 1.8 ∞ 25 23 ∞
3 1.5 2.4 90.2 16 23 1125 6.3 2.3 ∞ 63 18 ∞
B. Rules Optimised for the Backward-Looking Euro Area Models
Rules optimised for AWM Rules optimised for DM
L %∆LL%∆L
θκλ CW SW DM CW SW DM CW SW AWM CW SW AWM
0 0 0 2.1 1.2 17.6 28 30 556 2.6 1.2 1.3 57 29 44
1/3 2.5 1.3 52.7 10 12 1454 3.0 1.4 1.5 31 26 19
1 3.1 1.3 199.4 11 10 4291 3.7 2.8 1.7 33 47 14
3 4.5 1.4 ∞ 15 9 ∞ 5.4 2.5 2.2 39 92 17
4 0 0 1.9 1.2 24.8 18 33 824 2.1 1.2 1.1 27 30 15
1/3 2.6 1.3 32.0 12 16 842 3.3 1.4 1.5 41 26 21
1 3.0 1.4 60.7 9 13 1237 3.3 1.7 2.0 17 45 33
3 4.3 1.4 342.5 10 12 4551 4.9 2.4 3.0 26 88 54
Notes: For each choice of the inﬂation and output-gap forecast horizons (θ and κ), for each preference
parameter (λ) and for each model, this table indicates the value of the policy-maker’s loss function (L)
and the percentage-point diﬀerence of the latter from the loss under the fully optimal policy (%∆L),
when the rule optimised for model m is evaluated in model n  = m. The notation “∞” indicates that the
implemented rule results in instability.
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April 2005Table B-3: The Stabilisation Performance of Bayesian Robust Interest-Rate Rules Gener-
ated with a Lower Weight of µ =0 .01 on Interest-Rate Variability
Lm generated in %∆Lm generated in
θκλ ρ α β CW SW AWM DM CW SW AWM DM
A. Optimisation across All Models
0 0 0 0.42 8.54 5.81 2.3 1.1 1.2 3.9 39 25 32 46
1/3 0.39 7.86 6.69 2.7 1.3 1.6 5.0 17 18 27 47
1 0.33 7.63 8.02 3.3 1.6 2.0 6.7 20 31 36 49
3 0.21 7.54 10.31 4.9 2.0 2.9 11.0 26 60 53 49
4 0 0 0.47 8.62 1.19 2.2 1.2 1.1 3.9 33 28 14 45
1/3 0.45 8.14 3.17 2.5 1.3 1.4 4.7 10 17 13 38
1 0.38 8.31 4.93 3.0 1.5 1.7 6.2 10 23 16 37
3 0.26 8.56 7.56 4.3 1.8 2.3 10.3 12 39 22 39
B. Optimisation across All Aggregate Models
0 0 0 0.56 2.73 1.53 2.0 1.1 1.2 21 21 32
1/3 0.59 1.74 4.78 2.5 1.2 1.4 7 11 14
1 0.63 1.04 7.03 3.0 1.3 1.7 6 10 12
3 0.61 0.65 10.37 4.1 1.4 2.1 6 11 10
4 0 0 0.64 4.78 0.81 2.1 1.1 1.1 29 25 16
1/3 0.57 3.77 4.07 2.5 1.3 1.3 8 13 7
1 0.59 3.09 6.63 3.0 1.3 1.6 6 11 7
3 0.58 2.66 10.17 4.1 1.4 2.1 6 12 7
Notes: For each choice of the inﬂation and output-gap forecast horizons (θ and κ) and for each preference
parameter (λ), this table indicates the jointly optimised interest-rate response coeﬃcients (ρ, α and β), the
contribution of the individual model m to the policy-maker’s loss function (Lm) and the percentage-point
diﬀerence of this contribution from the loss under the fully optimal policy (%∆Lm).
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Real-Time Information Set with θ = κ = −1
A. The Forward-Looking Euro Area Models
CW SW
λρ α βL %∆L ραβ L %∆L
0 0.95 0.79 0.11 1.8 2 1.02 0.79 0.08 1.0 3
1/3 0.76 0.48 0.91 2.6 6 0.98 0.56 1.38 1.4 11
1 0.74 0.29 1.58 3.2 5 0.96 0.35 2.62 1.6 12
3 0.72 0.28 2.43 4.8 6 0.98 0.00 3.44 1.9 20
B. The Backward-Looking Euro Area Models
AWM DM
λρ α βL %∆L ραβ L %∆L
0 0.42 0.99 1.11 1.4 34 0.17 6.07 4.26 7.3 88
1/3 0.27 0.82 2.16 2.2 40 0.13 6.06 4.46 8.3 85
1 0.26 0.54 3.19 3.4 55 0.07 6.02 4.77 10.1 81
3 0.25 0.34 4.60 6.1 84 0.00 5.79 5.30 14.8 74
Notes: For each preference parameter (λ) and for each model, this table indicates the optimised interest-rate
response coeﬃcients (ρ, α and β), the value of the policy-maker’s loss function (L) and the percentage-point
diﬀerence of the latter from the loss under the fully optimal policy (%∆L).
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April 2005Table C-2: The Robustness of Optimised Interest-Rate Rules Based on a Real-Time Infor-
mation Set with θ = κ = −1
A. Rules Optimised for the Forward-Looking Euro Area Models
Rules optimised for CW Rules optimised for SW
L %∆LL %∆L
λ SW AWM DM SW AWM DM CW AWM DM CW AWM DM
0 1.0 ∞∞ 6 ∞∞ 1.9 ∞∞ 4 ∞∞
1/3 1.4 2.8 66.7 18 80 1388 2.8 13.7 68.0 14 766 1417
1 1.7 4.5 ∞ 24 103 ∞ 3.8 21.4 ∞ 23 872 ∞
3 2.2 8.5 ∞ 38 157 ∞ ME ∞∞ ME ∞∞
B. Rules Optimised for the Backward-Looking Euro Area Models
Rules optimised for AWM Rules optimised for DM
L %∆LL %∆L
λ CW SW DM CW SW DM CW SW AWM CW SW AWM
0 2.2 1.3 94.5 20 36 2345 3.5 1.6 2.5 93 71 140
1/3 2.7 1.6 ∞ 11 29 ∞ 3.9 1.9 3.2 61 50 106
1 ME 1.9 ∞ ME 38 ∞ 4.8 2.3 4.6 59 67 110
3 ME 2.6 ∞ ME 58 ∞ 7.1 3.5 8.0 57 115 143
Notes: For each preference parameter (λ) and for each model, this table indicates the value of the policy-
maker’s loss function (L) and the percentage-point diﬀerence of the latter from the loss under the fully
optimal policy (%∆L), when the rule optimised for model m is evaluated in model n  = m. The notation
“ME” indicates that the implemented rule yields multiple equilibria; the notation “∞” indicates that the
implemented rule results in instability.
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on a Real-Time Information Set with θ = κ = −1
Lm generated in %∆Lm generated in
λρ α β CW SW AWM DM CW SW AWM DM
A. Optimisation across All Models
0 0.41 3.62 2.52 2.7 1.3 1.9 7.8 48 44 81 103
1/3 0.41 3.57 2.88 3.2 1.6 2.8 8.7 31 30 80 95
1 0.39 3.62 3.46 4.1 2.0 4.3 10.6 33 44 95 89
3 0.32 3.75 4.54 6.2 2.9 7.4 15.5 37 76 125 82
B. Optimisation across All Aggregate Models
0 0.65 0.78 0.61 2.1 1.2 1.4 14 26 40
1/3 0.51 0.64 1.70 2.6 1.5 2.3 8 22 44
1 0.47 0.57 2.68 3.3 1.8 3.5 9 29 60
3 0.41 0.59 4.10 5.1 2.4 6.2 13 45 88
Notes: For each preference parameter (λ), this table indicates the jointly optimised interest-rate response
coeﬃcients (ρ, α and β), the contribution of the individual model m to the policy-maker’s loss function
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